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We analyze how the rise of institutional investors has transformed 
the governance landscape. While corporate ownership is now concentrated 
in the hands of institutional investors that can exercise stewardship of those 
corporations that would be impossible for dispersed shareholders, the 
investment managers of these institutional investors have agency problems 
vis-à-vis their own investors. We develop an analytical framework for 
examining these agency problems and apply it to study several key types of 
investment managers. 
We analyze how the investment managers of mutual funds - both 
index funds and actively managed funds - have incentives to underspend on 
stewardship and to side excessively with managers of corporations. We 
show that these incentives are especially acute for managers of index funds, 
and that the rise of such funds has system-wide adverse consequences for 
corporate governance. Activist hedge funds have substantially better 
incentives than managers of index funds or active mutual funds, but their 
activities do not provide a complete solution for the agency problems of 
institutional investors. 
Our analysis provides a framework for future work on institutional 
investors and their agency problems, and generates insights on a wide range 
of policy questions. We discuss implications for disclosure by institutional 
investors; regulation of their fees; stewardship codes; the rise of index 
investing; proxy advisors; hedge funds; wolf pack activism; and the 
allocation of power between corporate managers and shareholders. 
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F inancial economics and corporate governance have long focused on the agency problems between corporate managers and shareholders that result from the dispersion of ownership in large publicly traded corpora-
tions. In this paper, we focus on how the rise of institutional investors over the 
past several decades has transformed the corporate landscape and, in turn, 
the governance problems of the modern corporation. The rise of institutional 
investors has led to increased concentration of equity ownership, with most 
public corporations now having a substantial proportion of their shares held by 
a small number of institutional investors. At the same time, these institutions 
are controlled by investment managers, which have their own agency problems 
vis-à-vis their own beneficial investors. These agency problems are the focus of 
our analysis.
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We develop an analytical framework for understanding the agency prob- 
lems of institutional investors. We apply this framework to examine the agency prob-
lems and behavior of several key types of investment managers, including those that 
manage mutual funds—both index funds and actively managed funds—and activist 
hedge funds.
We identify several drivers of agency problems that afflict the decisions of invest-
ment managers of either passive index funds, active mutual funds, or both. First, 
such investment managers generally capture only a small fraction of the benefits that 
results from their stewardship activities while bearing the full cost of such activities. 
Further, competition with other investment managers is typically insufficient to elimi-
nate these agency problems. Finally, investment managers may be further influenced 
by private incentives, such as their interest in obtaining business from corporations, 
that encourage them to side excessively with managers of corporations. 
We show that index funds have especially poor incentives to engage in steward-
ship activities that could improve governance and increase value. Accordingly, while 
the rise of index funds benefits investors and the economy by reducing the costs of 
financial intermediation, this trend also has systemwide adverse consequences on 
governance. 
Activist hedge funds have substantially better incentives than managers of 
index funds or active mutual funds. While their activities may partially compensate, 
we show that they do not provide a complete solution for the agency problems of 
other institutional investors.
We recognize that well-meaning investment managers of index funds and 
active mutual funds may sometimes make stewardship decisions that are superior to 
those suggested purely by their incentive calculus. Our focus, however, is on under-
standing the structural incentive problems that should be recognized in assessing 
the current governance landscape. 
There is a growing recognition by researchers, capital market participants, 
and public officials that investment fund managers are imperfect agents for 
those investing in their funds, and there is now significant literature on this 
problem. Our analytical framework contributes by identifying the direction and 
manner in which the behavior of investment fund managers can be expected to 
deviate from the interests of their beneficial investors. For example, by demon-
strating that the agency problems of institutional investors can be expected to 
lead them to underinvest in stewardship and side excessively with corporate 
managers, we show that concerns about the existence of such agency problems 
provide little basis for weakening shareholder rights or impeding shareholder 
action. 
Furthermore, our analysis also generates insights on a wide range of policy 
questions and provides a framework for future work. We conclude by offering impli-
cations in a number of areas: disclosure by institutional investors and regulation of 
their fees; stewardship codes; the rise of index investing; proxy advisors; hedge fund 
and wolf pack activism; the allocation of power between corporate managers and 
shareholders; and others. 
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The Rise of Institutional Investors
In their classic work on the separation of ownership and control, Berle and 
Means (1932) introduced the problem of publicly traded companies with widely 
dispersed ownership. In such situations, Berle and Means explained that, “[a]s his 
personal vote will count for little or nothing at the meeting … the stockholder is 
practically reduced to the alternative of not voting at all or else of handing over his 
vote” to the proxy committee, appointed by existing management, who can “virtu-
ally dictate their own successors” (p. 87). Because dispersed shareholders can thus 
be expected to be rationally apathetic, managers will be relatively unconstrained 
in their actions, which Berle and Means refer to as “management control” of the 
corporation.
Furthermore, Berle and Means (1932) documented that a significant propor-
tion of publicly traded corporations have a sufficiently broad dispersion of 
shareholders to be classified as management-controlled. For example, Berle and 
Means (pp. 107–109, table XII, panel G) show that, of the largest 200 corporations 
in 1930 that they listed as being controlled by hired managers (rather than run 
directly by owners), the aggregate percentage of the corporation’s equity owned by 
the corporation’s largest 20 shareholders had a mean of 10.55 percent (median of 
10.6 percent).
Some classic articles by financial economists, following Berle and Means 
(1932), assume that shareholders of publicly traded firms are “atomistic” and have 
no incentive to seek governance improvements in the firms in which they own 
shares (for example, Grossman and Hart 1980; Shleifer and Vishny 1986). Given the 
practical infeasibility of such shareholder activities in the Berle–Means corporation, 
some researchers have focused on how other mechanisms, such as the discipline 
of the market for corporate control (Manne 1965), stock ownership by managers 
(Demsetz 1983), or price pressure due to sale of shares by investors seeking to exit 
underperforming companies (Admati and Pfleiderer 2009) could constrain the 
agency problems of managers and thereby make up for the lack of direct share-
holder effort to improve governance. 
Berle and Means (1932, p. 47) argued that “[d]ispersion in the ownership of 
separate enterprises appears to be inherent in the corporate system. It has already 
proceeded far, it is rapidly increasing, and appears to be an inevitable develop-
ment.” However, the trend toward dispersion has been reversed in subsequent 
decades by the rise of institutional investors. The rise of institutional investors 
has been driven by investor recognition of the value of low-cost diversification 
and encouraged by favorable regulatory and tax treatment. Whereas institutional 
investors held 6.1 percent of outstanding corporate equity in 1950 (Tonello and 
Rabimov 2010), they held 63 percent of outstanding public corporate equity in 
2016 (Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System 2016, p. 130). Further-
more, because institutional investors aggregate the assets of a vast number of 
individuals, each institutional investor can hold large positions in many publicly 
traded companies.
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As a result of the rise of institutional investors, the scenario of dispersed owner-
ship described by Berle and Means (1932) no longer approximates reality, not even 
for the largest publicly traded corporations. Table 1 lists the largest 20 US corpora-
tions by market capitalization as of June 30, 2016 (excluding controlled corporations), 
and the aggregate percentage of the stock of each corporation owned by their largest 
5, 20, and 50 institutional investors.1
As Table 1 shows, current share ownership is significantly more concentrated 
than the level described by Berle and Means (1932). Indeed, because the figures in 
Table 1 exclude large holdings by noninstitutional investors, they likely underesti-
mate the degree to which shares are concentrated among investors with significant 
 holdings. Even among the largest 20 corporations, the largest 20 institutional 
1 Investment advisers that manage multiple mutual funds generally have corporate governance staff that 
cast votes in the same way for each fund and undertake stewardship on behalf of each fund. Accordingly, 
for the purposes of these calculations, we group the shareholdings of the mutual funds managed by each 
investment manager as a single “institutional investor.”
Table 1 
Institutional Ownership of the 20 Largest US Corporations
Percentage owned by largest holders
Corporation Largest 5 Largest 20 Largest 50
1. Apple Inc. 17.5% 26.8% 35.4%
2. Microsoft Corp. 20.5% 33.1% 43.2%
3. Exxon Mobil Corp. 17.8% 27.1% 35.2%
4. Johnson & Johnson 19.0% 30.3% 40.5%
5. General Electric Co. 17.5% 28.0% 37.3%
6. AT&T Inc. 19.0% 28.8% 37.4%
7. Wells Fargo & Co. 24.9% 40.2% 51.0%
8. Verizon Communications Inc. 20.1% 32.9% 43.7%
9. Procter & Gamble Co. 18.4% 28.3% 38.2%
10. JPMorgan Chase & Co. 19.5% 34.7% 47.1%
11. Pfizer Inc. 18.7% 32.1% 45.1%
12. Chevron Corp. 21.6% 33.9% 43.6%
13. Coca-Cola Co. 26.6% 39.9% 48.6%
14. Visa Inc. 23.8% 41.7% 56.3%
15. Home Depot Inc. 24.4% 37.4% 49.1%
16. Disney (Walt) Co. 17.9% 29.6% 39.1%
17. Merck & Co. 26.1% 38.4% 50.1%
18. Philip Morris International 24.8% 40.9% 52.1%
19. Intel Corp. 20.2% 32.9% 44.6%
20. Cisco Systems Inc. 18.8% 32.2% 45.7%
Mean 20.8% 33.4% 44.2%
Median 19.8% 32.9% 44.2%
Source: FactSet Ownership database (by FactSet Research Systems).
Note: The table shows the aggregate ownership of the largest holders of the largest 20 US 
corporations by market capitalization as of June 30, 2016, excluding controlled corporations.
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investors in 2016 had mean ownership of 33.4 percent (and similar median 
ownership of 32.9 percent), more than three times the figure reported by Berle 
and Means (1932); in each of the 20 corporations, the largest 20 institutional 
investors own more than 25 percent. Furthermore, among these very large public 
corporations, the percentage owned by the largest 50 institutional investors 
has a mean of 44.2 percent (the median is also 44.2 percent). The increase in 
concentration is perhaps most vivid when looking at the aggregate percentage 
owned by the largest five shareholders, which has a mean of 20.8 percent 
(median of 19.8 percent) and is above 17 percent in each of the 20 largest US 
corporations.
Data from ISS Voting Analytics shows that the mean percentage of shares 
outstanding voted at the 2015 annual meetings of these corporations for the 
election of directors was 68.7 percent (median of 70.8 percent). The largest 
50 institutional investors thus cast a substantial majority of the votes at these 
annual meetings.
Thus, large institutional shareholders hold sufficiently sizable positions in 
each large corporation to have a non-negligible effect on the outcomes of share-
holder votes. Moreover, these shareholders recognize that many of their fellow 
shareholders are similarly non-atomistic. Of course, because the benefits of each 
shareholder’s actions will be shared with fellow shareholders, it will still be privately 
optimal for each shareholder to underspend on stewardship. However, given the 
current concentrated ownership of publicly traded corporations, if each shareholder 
were solely investing its own money, it would no longer be rational for all share-
holders to be rationally apathetic. On the contrary, given that some stewardship 
involves limited costs and can generate significant increases in value, it is likely to 
be privately optimal for some shareholders with significant holdings to undertake 
such activities.
As a result of these changes, the prospects for stewardship by shareholders are 
substantially better today than in Berle–Means corporations. Institutional investors 
participate in corporate voting, and there is empirical evidence that the presence 
of institutional investors influences how corporations are governed (for example, 
Hartzell and Starks 2003; Aghion, Van Reenen, and Zingales 2013).  Institutional 
investors therefore provide constraints on agency problems in their portfolio 
companies that dispersed shareholders in Berle–Means corporations were unable 
to accomplish.
However, investment managers invest other people’s money. Thus, the 
question arises whether their stewardship decisions would be the same as those 
that they would make if they were solely investing their own money. Below we 
analyze the agency problems that could lead these investment managers to 
deviate from the stewardship decisions that would be optimal for their benefi-
cial investors. These agency problems limit the extent to which our corporate 
governance system is able to benefit from the increased concentration of share-
holdings, and are a key impediment to improving the governance of publicly traded 
corporations.
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Stewardship by Investment Managers 
Investment Funds, Active and Passive
By investment funds we refer to funds that pool together the assets of many 
individuals and entities and invest them in a diversified portfolio of securities. The 
category of investment funds includes open-end mutual funds, closed-end mutual 
funds, exchange-traded funds, and other similar funds. Most of these investment 
funds are technically “investment companies,” as defined and regulated by the 
Investment Company Act of 1940. Given our emphasis on corporate governance, 
we naturally focus on funds that invest in equity securities. Investment funds are the 
most important category of institutional investors and represent most of the assets 
held by institutional investors. 
Investment funds generally enter into contracts with organizations, referred 
to in US securities regulations as “investment advisers,” to manage the porfo-
lios of investment funds. We will refer to these organizations as “investment 
managers.” 
Investment funds focusing on equity securities can be categorized by their 
investing strategy into those that actively manage their portfolio and those that 
passively invest by matching their portfolio weightings of corporations to those of an 
underlying equity index. We refer to the latter, which include both open-end mutual 
funds and exchange-traded funds, as index funds. Most mutual fund managers 
operate a number of mutual funds, often referred to collectively as a “mutual fund 
family.” While most mutual fund families include both actively managed funds and 
index funds, mutual fund families predominantly operate one or the other kind of 
investment fund. 
The index fund market is dominated by three investment managers: Black-
Rock, Vanguard, and State Street Global Advisors (sometimes referred to as the 
“Big Three”). These investment managers have assets under management of $3.1 
trillion, $2.5 trillion, and $1.9 trillion, respectively (Diamond 2016). The largest 
investment managers of actively managed funds include Fidelity Investments 
and the Capital Group, both of which have more than $1 trillion in assets under 
management. 
We pay particular attention to index funds because their share of the market 
for managed investments has increased significantly in recent years, a trend that 
is expected to continue. The move towards index funds is driven by the growing 
recognition of their low costs and tax advantages, and the evidence that they outper-
form most actively managed equity mutual funds (French 2008). Passively managed 
funds increased from 1 percent of total fund assets in 1984 to 12.6 percent in 2006 
(French 2008), and the move from active to passive funds has continued since 
then. From 2013 to 2016, investors added $1.3 trillion to passive mutual funds and 
exchange-traded funds (Tergesen and Zweig 2016).
The rise of index investing has benefits in reducing the costs of interme-
diation borne by investors; as of the end of 2015, the asset-weighted average 
net expense ratio was only 0.12 percent for US equity index funds, compared 
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to 0.79 percent for actively managed US equity funds (Oey and West 2016, 
p. 6). We recognize this benefit to investors, but wish to stress a systemic cost 
of index funds. As we discuss below, while agency problems afflict the steward-
ship activities of all investment funds, they are likely to be especially acute for 
index funds.
Stewardship
Our focus is on those decisions of investment managers that relate to the stew-
ardship of companies in their portfolio. Stewardship by investment managers can 
take several forms. Most investment funds are required to vote at shareholder meet-
ings on director elections and management and shareholder proposals, and to have 
an internal process for making voting decisions. Thus, not voting, or voting in a 
patently uninformed manner, is not an option for investment managers. Steward-
ship therefore requires monitoring of corporate managers and other information 
gathering in order to inform voting, engagement, and other stewardship activi-
ties. Investment managers can nominate candidates for election as directors or put 
forward shareholder proposals, and they can communicate with the corporation, 
or with other shareholders, about such matters. While stewardship may also relate 
to environmental and social matters that affect investors (for example, Hirst 2016), 
our focus in this paper is on stewardship decisions that affect beneficial investors 
only through their effect on the financial value of the managed portfolio. 
Stewardship decisions can be split into two parts: 1) spending decisions 
regarding how much to expend on stewardship; and 2) qualitative decisions 
regarding which way to vote or which positions to take in communications with 
corporate managers and other shareholders. 
Like all organizations with multiple employees, investment managers have 
their own internal agency problems. Our analysis can be thought of as analyzing the 
incentives that would shape the stewardship strategies that the leaders of investment 
managers would pursue, for example, choices regarding the resources to provide 
for corporate governance and proxy voting units and setting the general policy and 
approach of such units.
Because the voting and stewardship decisions of mutual fund families are 
commonly concentrated in a single corporate governance department or proxy 
voting department of the investment manager, the stewardship incentives of invest-
ment managers with different types of funds are a composite of the different 
incentives we identify below for the different types of investment funds.
Sources of Agency Problems 
The Benchmark Scenario: Decisions that Maximize Portfolio Value
Let us consider a hypothetical scenario with no agency problems in managing 
such investments. For instance, imagine that each of the positions were those of 
sole owners that owned and managed 100 percent of each investment. In this case, 
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the decisions made would be ones that maximize the value of the owners’ wealth. 
More specifically, suppose that some stewardship activity will cost C and will increase 
the value of the position by ΔV.  Then, in the benchmark, no-agency scenario, the 
stewardship activity will be undertaken if C < ΔV.2
For large equity positions, like those that investment managers hold in many 
companies, the no-agency-costs scenario would often justify meaningful invest-
ments in stewardship activities. If an investor had a $1 billion investment in a given 
portfolio company, and investment in certain stewardship activities would increase 
the value of the company by 0.1 percent, then the investor would have an incen-
tive to spend up to $1 million on stewardship to bring about this change. We note 
that each large mutual fund family holds positions exceeding $1 billion in value 
in a large number of public companies; data from the FactSet Ownership data-
base shows that, as of December 31, 2016, BlackRock, Capital Research, Fidelity, 
State Street Global Advisors, and Vanguard each held such positions at a substantial 
proportion of corporations in the S&P 500 index.
In many cases, stewardship decisions may be merely qualitative, and not involve 
additional cost. This is commonly the case when investment managers decide how 
to cast a vote or what position to take in interactions with corporate managers or 
fellow shareholders. Suppose that voting or otherwise taking a position against the 
outcome management prefers would change the value of the position by ΔV, where 
ΔV can be positive or negative. In such a case, in the no-agency-cost benchmark 
scenario, the investor should make a choice against managers’ preferences when-
ever ΔV  is positive.
Capturing Only a Small Fraction of the Benefit 
We now turn to the decisions that the investment manager would find privately 
optimal. Although we will later relax these assumptions, we will initially take as 
given the size of fees charged by investment managers and the size of the portfolio 
managed.
One key source of agency problems is that investment managers bear the costs 
of stewardship activities, but capture only a small fraction of the benefits they create. 
Under existing regulations governing mutual funds, investment managers cannot 
charge their personnel and other management expenses directly to the portfolio. 
For example, if an investment manager were to employ staff fully dedicated to 
stewardship of a single corporation, or if an investment manager were to conduct 
a proxy fight in opposition to incumbent managers, it would have to cover those 
expenses itself, out of the fee income it receives from investors.
At the same time, the benefits from stewardship flow to the portfolio. Mutual 
fund managers and investment managers of other similarly structured funds are not 
permitted to collect incentive fees on increases in the value of their portfolio but 
2 In developing our analytical framework, we draw upon the model in Bebchuk and Neeman (2010), which 
explains how the decisions that institutional investors make with respect to lobbying regarding investor 
protection levels differ from the decisions that would be optimal for the beneficial investors in those funds.
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may only charge fees that are calculated as a percentage of assets under manage-
ment. Let α be the fraction of assets under management that an investment 
manager charges as fees. Therefore, α is also fraction of the increase in the value 
of a portfolio company that an investment fund will be able to capture, in present 
value terms, from additional fees. The value of α is likely to be small given that the 
asset-weighted average net expense ratio for US equity index funds was 0.12 percent 
as of December 31, 2015 (Oey and West 2016). It would not be in the interests of 
the investment manager to spend an amount C that would produce a gain of ΔV 
to the portfolio if C is larger than α × ΔV. Thus, in this setting, agency problems 
would lead to underspending on stewardship, precluding efficient expenditure, 
whenever:
 α × ΔV < C < ΔV
To illustrate this wedge, reconsider the example above of an investment 
manager of an index fund that holds a $1 billion investment in a portfolio company 
whose value could increase by $1 million as a result of certain stewardship activities. 
If the investment manager could expect additional fees with a present value of 0.12 
percent from the changes in the value of the position, it would be willing to take 
such actions only if their cost was below $1,200, compared to $1  million in the 
no-agency-costs scenario. 
Although investment managers of actively managed funds charge higher fees, 
because those fees are still a very small fraction of the investment, they will have only 
slightly higher incentives to spend on stewardship. If such an investment manager 
received additional fees of 0.79 percent of the change in the value of the position—
the asset-weighted average net expense ratio for actively-managed US equity mutual 
funds as of December 31, 2015 (Oey and West 2016)—then it would be willing 
to take such actions only if their cost was below $7,900. Thus, managers of active 
mutual funds still have strong incentives to spend much less on stewardship than 
would be value-maximizing for their portfolio. 
The Limits of Competition: Index Funds 
Thus far, our analysis has assumed that investment managers take their fees and 
assets under management as given when making stewardship decisions. By relaxing 
this assumption, we now consider whether the desire to improve performance and 
attract additional funds might counter the distortions identified above and lead 
investment managers to make additional investments in stewardship that would be 
portfolio-value-maximizing.
In examining this question, it is important to recognize that what matters for 
attracting assets under management (and thereby increasing future fee revenue) 
is not the absolute performance of the investment manager, but its performance 
relative to alternative investment opportunities. Potential investors in equity mutual 
funds can be expected to judge the investment manager’s performance relative to 
an equity index, or relative to other comparable equity mutual funds. As a result, in 
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many cases, the consideration of improving relative performance would not provide 
any incentives to improve stewardship decisions. 
In particular, this is the situation in the important case of the investment 
managers of passively managed index mutual funds. If the investment manager of 
a certain mutual fund that invests according to a given index increases its spending 
on stewardship at a particular portfolio company and thereby increases the value 
of its investment in that company, it will also increase the value of the index, so its 
expenditure would not lead to any increase in the performance of the mutual fund 
relative to the index. Nor would it lead to any increase relative to the investment 
manager’s rivals that follow the same index, as any increase in the value of the corpo-
ration would also be captured by all other mutual funds investing according to the 
index, even though they had not made any additional expenditure on stewardship.
Thus, if the investment manager were to take actions that increase the value 
of the portfolio company, and therefore also the portfolio that tracks the index, 
doing so would not result in a superior performance that could enable the manager 
to attract funds currently invested with rival investment managers. Such decisions 
would also not enable the investment manager to increase fees relative to rivals 
tracking the same index, as such rivals would offer the same gross return without the 
increased fees. Accordingly, for managers of index funds, a desire to improve rela-
tive performance would not provide any incentives that could counter tendencies 
that the investment manager might otherwise have to underspend on stewardship 
and to side with corporate managers more often than is optimal for the investment 
managers’ beneficial investors.
It could be argued that the inability of index funds to attract additional inves-
tors by increasing stewardship spending implies that the existing equilibrium is 
optimal. However, our analysis indicates that this equilibrium is due to a collective 
action problem. The beneficial investors of an index fund would be better served 
by having the fund increase stewardship spending up to the level that would maxi-
mize the portfolio value, even if the fund increased its fees to fund this spending. 
However, if the index fund were to raise its fees and improve its stewardship, each 
individual investor in the fund would have an incentive to switch to rival index 
funds. That is, a move by any given index fund manager to improve stewardship 
and raise fees would unravel, because its investors would prefer to free-ride on the 
investment manager’s efforts by switching to another investment fund that offers 
the same indexed portfolio but without stewardship or higher fees. 
The Limits of Competition: Actively Managed Funds
Turning to actively managed funds, it is important to recognize that there is 
evidence that many of these funds are, to varying extents, “closet indexers” whose 
holdings substantially overlap with their benchmark index, deviating only by under-
weighting and overweighting certain stocks (Cremers and Petajisto 2009). For an 
actively managed fund that is to some extent a closet indexer, a desire to improve 
relative performance would provide no incentives to move stewardship deci-
sions toward optimality for any of the portfolio companies where the company’s 
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weighting in the investment fund’s portfolio is approximately equal to its weighting 
in the index; improving the value of those portfolio companies would not enhance 
performance relative to the index. 
Furthermore, for all the corporations that are underweight in the portfolio 
relative to the index, enhancing the value of the corporation would actually worsen 
the investment manager’s performance relative to the index. For corporations that 
are underweight in the portfolio, the consideration of increasing relative perfor-
mance does not provide any incentive to enhance the value of these corporations; 
on the contrary, this consideration weighs against trying to do so. 
Thus, the desire to improve relative performance could only provide an 
actively managed fund with incentives to improve value in those corporations that 
are overweight in the portfolio compared to the index. Even for such corporations, 
the extent to which improving the value of the corporation would improve fund 
performance will depend on the extent to which the corporation is overweight in 
the portfolio. 
Consider a portfolio company that constitutes 1 percent of the benchmark 
index and 1.2 percent of the investment fund. In this case, any increase in the value 
of the portfolio company will be substantially shared by rival funds that track the 
index at least partly. Indeed, the increase in value of the portfolio company will 
worsen the performance of the investment fund relative to rival funds that are more 
overweight with respect to the portfolio company. Thus, even for companies that 
are overweight within the portfolio of the investment fund relative to the index, the 
impact of the desire to improve relative performance would be diluted by the pres-
ence of the company in the benchmark index and in the portfolios of rival funds.
Furthermore, as discussed above, in most cases actively managed funds are part 
of mutual fund families composed of a number of mutual funds, and stewardship 
decisions are commonly made for all these investment funds by the fund family’s 
governance or proxy voting group. In such a case, the fact that a given actively 
managed fund is overweight in a particular corporation might be offset by the fact 
that other actively managed funds within the same fund family might be under-
weight. The investment manager of the fund family will have an incentive to bring 
about an increase in value only if its actively managed funds are on the whole over-
weight in this corporation, and the incentive will be diluted to the extent that any 
gains will be shared by other mutual fund families. 
In addition, an interest in improving their relative performance might also 
push investment managers in the opposite direction, and thereby exacerbate rather 
than alleviate distortions in stewardship decisions. Ke, Petroni, and Yu (2008, p. 
855) describe evidence that some institutional investors value “direct access to 
companies’ management,” presumably because they believe that, notwithstanding 
the limitations imposed by Regulation Fair Disclosure, being able to communi-
cate with managers will improve their trading decisions. For investment managers 
following active strategies, trading decisions that change the weight of a portfolio 
company relative to its weighting in the index are likely to be the main determinants 
of their performance relative to their benchmark index. To the extent that active 
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investment managers believe that making stewardship decisions that corporate 
managers disfavor might adversely affect their access to such managers, an interest 
in improving relative performance could provide incentives to avoid such decisions. 
Note that, to the extent that investment managers get access to corporate 
managers and consequently make better trading decisions, the gains from such 
trading decisions will improve the investment manager’s performance relative to 
others, since rivals will not share these trading gains. By comparison, gains from 
governance-generated improvements in the value of particular portfolio compa-
nies will be substantially shared with rivals. Thus, an interest in improving relative 
performance could well lead active fund managers to place more weight on gains 
to their portfolios from access to corporate managers relative to gains from 
 governance-generated increases in value, compared to what would be optimal for 
the investment funds’ beneficial investors.3 
Finally, without discussing the issue in detail, we want to flag a disagreement in 
the literature regarding the extent to which fund inflows and outflows are sensitive 
to changes in relative performance (for example, Sirri and Tufano 1998 and Coates 
and Hubbard 2007). To the extent that the sensitivity of inflows and outflows to 
performance is limited, competition with other investment funds will give invest-
ment managers limited incentives to improve the value of portfolio companies.
The Governance Passivity of Investment Funds
The above analysis suggests that investment managers, those managing both 
passive index funds and active mutual funds, have incentives to be “more passive” 
with respect to governance issues than is optimal for their beneficial investors.
With respect to index funds, our analysis is consistent with the practically negli-
gible resources that index funds spend on stewardship beyond what is required to 
comply with regulations requiring investment managers to vote shares in portfolio 
companies and to avoid doing so in an uninformed fashion. Vanguard employs 
about 15 staff for voting and stewardship at its 13,000 portfolio companies; Black-
Rock employs 24 staff for voting and stewardship at 14,000 portfolio companies; and 
State Street Global Advisors employs fewer than 10 staff for voting and stewardship 
at 9,000 portfolio companies (Krouse, Benoit, and McGinty 2016). 
Of course, these staff may receive information from proxy advisors as well as from 
active portfolio managers employed by the investment manager. However, each of 
these major investment managers devotes less than one person-workday per year, on 
average, to assessing this and other information, and undertaking other stewardship 
activities with respect to each of their portfolio companies. Note that each of these 
investment managers is likely to hold several percent of each company’s stock and 
to be among their largest shareholders. Given the size and value of the positions 
3 An increase in relative gross returns could be used by an investment manager not to attract additional 
funds but to extract an increase in the level of fees charged without risking an outflow of funds. The 
above analysis, suggesting that an interest in increasing relative performance is unlikely to induce 
optimal stewardship decisions, also applies equally to this scenario. 
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that each of these investment managers holds in large public companies, there are 
grounds for concern that these managers substantially underinvest in stewardship.
With respect to active mutual funds, our analysis is similarly consistent with 
the very limited resources that predominantly actively managed mutual fund fami-
lies currently spend on stewardship. Even the largest such mutual fund families 
employ only a small number of staff to make voting decisions and undertake all 
other governance-related stewardship activities in the vast number of corporations 
in which they hold stock.
In a companion paper, we document that this underinvestment by investment 
managers is reflected not only in the limited time that their staff spend on voting and 
stewardship activities, but also in the absence of these investment managers from 
the ranks of investors that use certain significant tools to generate value increases 
from improved governance that benefit the investment funds (Bebchuk, Cohen, 
and Hirst 2017). For example, large investment managers generally avoid submit-
ting shareholder proposals, nominating directors to the boards of corporations, 
or conducting proxy contests. Their absence might be due not only to incentives 
to underspend on stewardship, but also to private costs that investment managers 
viewed as oppositional to managers might have to bear, which we discuss below. 
Our companion paper also addresses the argument that substantial passivity on 
the part of investment managers is optimal, and that the underspending problem 
is therefore of limited economic importance. Such an argument could be justified 
if other mechanisms—such as the discipline of the market for corporate control, 
executive incentives schemes, or monitoring and engagement by other inves-
tors—could be relied on to eliminate agency problems in public companies. We 
argue, however, that the limits of such mechanisms make it plausible to assume that 
improved stewardship by the investment managers that hold a large proportion of 
the shares of most publicly traded companies can significantly improve outcomes 
for their own investors.
There is a growing recognition of the power of large investment managers, 
and concomitantly increasing expectation that they will use this power to improve 
the governance of their portfolio companies. The leaders of the largest index fund 
managers have responded by making public announcements stressing their commit-
ment to stewardship, and to improving corporate governance (for example, Fink 
2015; McNabb 2015). These executives may indeed believe in the desirability of 
governance improvements and sincerely wish to help bring them about. However, 
our economic analysis indicates that investment managers may well have very limited 
economic incentives to spend on stewardship, and may have economic incentives to 
be more lax toward corporate managers, compared with what would be optimal for 
their beneficial investors.  
Private Costs from Opposing Managers
Another significant source of agency problems introduced by the separation 
between investment managers and beneficial owners is that investment managers 
may bear private costs from taking positions that corporate managers disfavor. When 
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such private costs may result, investment managers may be more reluctant to spend 
on actions or make qualitative decisions that are disfavored by corporate managers. 
Suppose that such an action would result in a change in the value of the portfolio 
of ΔV but a private indirect cost of IC to the investment manager. The investment 
manager will take the disfavored action only if C + IC is less than α × ΔV.
For qualitative choices that would not involve any additional marginal cost but 
would have an expected positive effect on the value of the portfolio (that is, ΔV > 0), 
the investment manager would prefer to side with managers if IC > α × ΔV. Thus, 
the investment manager would prefer to avoid taking a position disfavored by 
managers that would be optimal for the managed portfolio if and only if:
 0 < ΔV <  IC ___α .
What is important is not whether avoiding such actions actually helps invest-
ment managers obtain business, but whether investment managers believe that to 
be the case, on an expected value basis. The smaller is α, the wider the range of 
increases in value that the investment manager would forgo not to bear expected 
indirect costs of taking actions that corporate managers disfavor. That investment 
funds charge fees below 1 percent (on average) strengthens the distortion resulting 
from potential indirect costs.
One important source of costs from taking positions that corporate managers 
disfavor (or benefits from taking positions that managers favor) comes from 
the incentives of investment managers to obtain or retain business from public 
corporations. In 2015, 401(k) assets under management totaled $4.7 trillion, 
with 60 percent held in mutual funds (Collins, Holden, Duvall, and Chism 2016, 
p. 2); most of these assets are likely to come from public corporations. Cvijanović, 
Dasgupta, and Zachariadis (2016) document that an average of 14 percent of 
fund family revenue is derived from 401(k)-related business. The largest index 
fund managers and active managers all derive business from 401(k) services, and 
therefore have strong incentives to attract and retain such business from public 
corporations. 
In addition, many investment managers provide investment services to corpo-
rations, both to manage cash and short-term investments and also to manage the 
long-term investments of financial corporations such as insurance companies. Invest-
ment managers may also provide investment management services to pension funds 
that are sponsored by public corporations, and over which the corporation may 
have some influence. US private sector pension funds had aggregate assets under 
management of $2.9 trillion in 2015 (Investment Company Institute 2016). Several 
empirical studies provide evidence suggesting that business ties with corporations 
influence the voting decisions of investment managers. Davis and Kim (2007) find 
that the volume of pension fund business of investment managers was associated 
with those investment managers voting more often with corporate managers on 
several key types of shareholder proposals. Ashraf, Jayaraman, and Ryan (2012) find 
that mutual fund families that have greater business ties to corporations tend to vote 
Lucian A. Bebchuk, Alma Cohen, and Scott Hirst     103
more favorably toward corporate managers on executive compensation matters at 
all corporations. 
These studies focus on the association between corporate business ties in 
general and voting in corporations in general. Cvijanović, Dasgupta, and  Zachariadis 
(2016) examine contested shareholder proposals where corporate managers care 
more about votes for their favored position, and find that mutual fund families 
with business ties to a corporation are more likely to cast pro-management votes 
in closely contested situations at the corporation. Although this study provides 
evidence that an investment manager’s business ties with particular corporations 
provide incentives to vote with corporate managers in close votes, there are clear 
limits to the ability of investment managers to treat managers of client corporations 
more favorably than their general voting policy would provide. Therefore, in our 
view, the more important concern is that investment managers will have an incen-
tive to lean in a pro-management direction when determining their strategies and 
policies regarding stewardship.
Given the limited economic incentive that investment managers have to 
generate governance gains in portfolio companies, and their strong economic 
interest in attracting more business, choosing a pro-management approach within 
the range of the legitimate choices available to them may seem the safest approach 
to investment managers. Investment managers would have an incentive to take such 
an approach as long as they believe that doing so might help them get additional 
business from public corporations on an expected value basis. 
Finally, we note certain additional private costs that are relevant only to the 
largest investment managers and may contribute to discouraging these major 
players from opposing corporate managers. Some mutual fund families hold close 
to or above 5 percent of the stock in many public corporations. Indeed, the three 
index fund managers that dominate the index fund sector—Vanguard, Black-
Rock, and State Street Global Advisors—hold such positions in most large publicly 
traded corporations; Fidelity Investments and the Capital Group also hold such 
positions in many public corporations, and Dimensional Fund Advisors holds 
such positions in many smaller public corporations. Investment managers holding 
such positions would bear additional private costs in the event that they attempt 
to wield significant influence—and therefore have a significant incentive to avoid 
doing so. 
Under Section 13(d) of the Exchange Act of 1934, investors that own or 
control, in the aggregate, 5 percent or more of a corporation’s shares and that seek 
to influence the control of the corporation are subject to extensive and repeated 
disclosure requirements on Schedule 13D. Nominating directors, undertaking a 
proxy contest for board representation, and other significant engagement action 
would classify investment managers as seeking to influence control. By contrast, 
investment managers that are not classified as seeking to influence control are 
subject only to the relatively limited disclosure requirements on Schedule 13G. 
Becoming subject to the substantial and repeated disclosure on Schedule 13D 
would be very costly for the investment managers of major fund families, which 
104     Journal of Economic Perspectives
typically manage multiple funds. Because the investment manager would have 
to bear these costs itself rather than charge them to the investment funds, the 
prospect of having to bear such costs provides additional incentives to avoid 
taking any actions that might be classified as seeking to influence the control of 
the corporation.
Activist Hedge Funds
Finally, we would like to discuss a different type of an investment manager, 
the activist hedge fund manager. Applying the framework described above shows 
why activist hedge fund managers suffer less from the agency problems that affect 
investment managers with diversified equity portfolios, and why activist hedge fund 
managers have incentives to make stewardship decisions that are significantly closer 
to those that would be optimal for their beneficial investors.
Why Activist Hedge Funds are Different
Hedge funds managers limit their investment offerings to investors consid-
ered to be sophisticated, and are therefore not subject to the regulations governing 
investment managers of mutual funds. Hedge funds therefore have considerably 
more freedom in the assets they own, their use of leverage, and their compensation 
structures. Our focus below is on the subset of hedge funds that take concentrated 
positions in the equity of public corporations and actively engage with corporate 
managers—activist hedge funds. For the reasons explained below, these hedge 
funds have significant influence on the corporate governance landscape. 
High-Powered Incentives to Increase Value. Hedge fund managers, including activist 
hedge fund managers, typically receive compensation based on two components, 
often referred to as “2 and 20” (French 2008): a management fee that is a relatively 
small percentage of the value of the assets, historically 2 percent, and an incentive 
payment, structured as a “carried interest” of a proportion (historically 20 percent) 
of any increase in value of the portfolio.
Leaving aside the management fee, which is higher than the average for an 
actively managed mutual fund but a similar order of magnitude, a hedge fund 
manager that is able to increase the value of a position in a portfolio company 
through investments in stewardship will capture 20 percent of this increase, an 
order of magnitude more than the percentage of any value increase that a mutual 
fund manager would be able to capture. Thus, activist hedge fund managers will 
have much stronger incentives to bring about governance-generated increases in 
value than investment managers of mutual funds, even when the latter hold posi-
tions with equal or greater dollar value.
Limited Business from Portfolio Companies. In contrast to mutual funds, which 
are registered investment companies and publicly issue securities, hedge funds 
are not registered investment companies and do not accept investments from 401(k) 
plans. Accordingly, activist hedge fund managers do not have a desire to attract 
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401(k) business that might discourage them from taking positions that corporate 
managers disfavor. In addition, activist hedge funds do not offer other services to 
corporations of the kind that many investment managers offer.
Concentrated Positions and Stronger Incentives Regarding Relative Performance. 
Activist hedge funds have concentrated positions, sometimes holding significant 
positions in as few as 10 portfolio companies. As a result, an improvement in the 
value of a single portfolio company that is a target of stewardship activities can 
substantially improve the fund manager’s performance relative to peer investment 
vehicles. This will, in turn, affect the manager’s ability to attract additional invest-
ments. For example, the investment of Pershing Square Capital Management LP in 
Canadian Pacific Railway Ltd. and General Growth Properties Inc. each constituted 
as much as one-fifth of the fund’s portfolio during certain periods, and the increase 
in the value of these positions enabled the fund to post strong performance.
Because of their small size and method of selection, activist hedge fund portfolios 
display very little correlation with those of competing funds, or with other investment 
opportunities available to their investors. Any changes in the value of their portfolio 
companies are therefore also clearly reflected in their relative performance against 
such comparable investments. This factor therefore strengthens the incentive of 
activist hedge fund managers to bring about governance-related improvements in the 
value of their portfolio companies. Thus, the desire to improve relative performance 
provides more powerful incentives for activist hedge funds to seek governance-related 
value improvements than it does for managers of index funds and active mutual funds. 
Clearly, the main factors that create a wedge between the interests of investment 
managers and the beneficial investors whose investments they manage affects activist 
hedge fund managers significantly less than investment managers of mutual funds. 
Consistent with this, activist hedge fund managers are much more willing to devote 
significant resources to stewardship. Activist hedge fund managers are often willing 
to devote hundreds of person-hours per year to monitoring and engaging with each 
of their portfolio companies. For instance, Pershing Square Capital Management 
has an investment team of eight, plus several other employees, that oversee a port-
folio of about 12 corporations (as reported in Krouse, Benoit, and McGinty 2016). 
Activist hedge fund managers are also willing to have representatives on the board 
of directors of portfolio companies, and often seek such representation. Such repre-
sentation not only requires significant personnel time, but also imposes constraints 
on the activist hedge fund manager’s trading in the portfolio company’s stock.
Furthermore, activist hedge fund managers frequently commence proxy contests 
at portfolio companies (Brav, Jiang, Partnoy, and Thomas 2008), despite the consid-
erable expenses associated with such contests (estimated by Gantchev 2013 to average 
about $10 million) and corporate managers’ views of such contests as adversarial. 
By contrast, managers of mutual funds have generally avoided conducting proxy 
contests at their portfolio companies, even where the mutual fund held a significant 
stake. Even in situations where activist hedge fund managers do not conduct proxy 
contests, they frequently take public positions that the managers of their portfolio 
companies disfavor, which other investment managers generally avoid. 
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Clearly activist hedge fund managers have different incentive structures that 
enable them to play an important role in the current governance landscape. This 
role is especially important in light of the significant agency problems that afflict 
the stewardship decisions of mutual fund managers. But while activist hedge fund 
managers play a beneficial role in the corporate governance system, there are signif-
icant limits to this beneficial role. 
The Limits of Hedge Funds
Activist hedge fund managers have incentives to spend on stewardship only 
when the governance-generated value increases likely to result are especially 
large. The incentives of activist hedge fund managers are driven by the significant 
performance-related fees that they earn, and by their concentrated portfolios. As a 
result, activist hedge fund managers can pursue only those corporations where the 
potential governance-related increases in value are sufficiently large that the funds’ 
investors can expect to make reasonable risk-adjusted returns after bearing the 
high fees charged by the hedge fund managers and the firm-specific risks from the 
funds’ concentrated portfolios. For example, where an activist hedge fund could 
buy a stake in a given corporation and bring about a 3 percent increase in value 
over a two-year period, the hedge fund manager would be unlikely to pursue this 
opportunity. 
This analysis is consistent with the fact that such funds usually focus on situations 
where governance failures have led to substantial operating underperformance. 
As a result, disclosures regarding the initiation of engagements by activist hedge 
fund managers are accompanied by abnormal returns that, on average, exceed 
5 percent, reflecting market expectations of a significant expected increase in value 
(for example, Brav et al. 2008; Bebchuk, Brav, and Jiang 2015).
Furthermore, for an activist hedge fund manager to bring about a governance-
generated increase in value, it is not only necessary that there be potential for such 
a large increase, but also that other institutional investors are willing to support the 
changes sought by the activist hedge fund manager. Activist hedge fund managers 
are unable to bring about changes unless they obtain the support of other types 
of institutional investors, or have a reasonable likelihood of doing so (Bebchuk 
and Jackson 2012). When an activist hedge fund manager enjoys such support for 
the changes it seeks, it will be able to win a proxy fight, or obtain a settlement 
by credibly threatening to do so, and thereby cause the corporation to make such 
changes. Conversely, when corporate managers expect that most institutional inves-
tors will side with them and not with activist hedge fund managers, activist hedge 
fund managers will not have much influence.
Mutual fund managers do sometimes vote on the side of activist hedge fund 
managers. Indeed, the expectation that this would be the case, and that activist 
hedge funds could therefore prevail in potential proxy fights, often leads corpo-
rate managers to accept activist hedge funds’ demands for board representation 
(Bebchuk, Brav, Jiang, and Keusch 2017). However, our analytical framework raises 
the concern that, on the margin, mutual fund managers might not be sufficiently 
Lucian A. Bebchuk, Alma Cohen, and Scott Hirst     107
willing to support activist hedge fund managers in their engagements with port-
folio companies where such support would be optimal for the mutual funds’ 
investors. Whether and to what extent this is the case is an interesting issue for 
future research.
Finally, we should briefly note the issue of short-termism and long-termism. 
Activist hedge fund managers have stronger incentives to bring about increases in 
value than other institutional investors. However, some scholars have argued that 
activist hedge fund managers focus on increases in short-term value and that the 
increases they seek often come at the expense of long-term value (for example, 
Strine 2014; Coffee and Palia 2015). One of us has addressed this claim in detail 
elsewhere on both conceptual and empirical grounds (Bebchuk 2013; Bebchuk, 
Brav, and Jiang 2015). Leaving aside the alleged distinction between short-term and 
long-term increases in value, a key point of our analysis is that activist hedge fund 
managers stand out relative to other institutional investors in terms of their incen-
tives to seek increased value.
Of course, index funds are long-term players, and can therefore be expected 
to favor only changes that would enhance value in the long term (for examples of 
this view, see Lipton 2014, 2016). But our analysis shows that investment managers 
overseeing index funds have very limited incentives to bring about governance-
generated increases in value, be they long-term or short-term.
Implications
The rise of institutional investors has transformed the governance landscape 
facing the modern corporation. With shares concentrated in the hands of insti-
tutional investors, corporate managers no longer face diffuse shareholders that 
are powerless to engage with managers. However, the agency problems of institu-
tional investors prevent the full realization of the potential benefits of the increased 
concentration of shareholdings. Investment managers overseeing diversified equity 
portfolios have incentives to spend considerably less on stewardship, and to side 
with corporate managers more frequently, than would be optimal for their bene-
ficial investors. These factors operate to suppress investor stewardship relative to 
optimal levels. 
In this paper, we have provided a framework for analyzing these agency prob-
lems. We have also applied this framework to several key categories of investment 
managers. Our analysis has significant implications for researchers and policy-
makers. While a full analysis of these implications is beyond the scope of this paper, 
we outline ten of these implications below.
1.  Research. Over recent decades, the amount of academic work analyzing 
agency problems in corporate governance has increased dramatically (for example, 
Bebchuk, Cohen, and Wang 2013), but most of this work has examined the agency 
problems of corporate insiders. We hope that our work will stimulate and provide a 
framework for future work on the agency problems of institutional investors.
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2. Disclosure. Public awareness and academic research about the agency prob-
lems of managers of publicly traded corporations is facilitated by the extensive 
disclosures made by such corporations about internal decisions. Policymakers may 
wish to consider adopting regulations that would require investment managers to 
disclose information that would enable investors and others to identify and assess 
agency problems. For example, investment managers of mutual funds have been 
required to disclose how they vote their shares in publicly traded corporations since 
2004, but some other investment managers are not required to do so. Furthermore, 
policymakers may want to consider tighter disclosure requirements that would 
provide comprehensive information about the business ties between investment 
managers and the public corporations in which they invest.
3.  Regulation of Mutual Fund Fees. Regulations that preclude key investment 
managers from charging stewardship expenses to their investment funds, or from 
tying fees to increases in the value of their portfolios, have significant effects on 
the stewardship decisions of these investment managers. These regulations might 
be justified to protect the beneficial investors in these investment funds. However, 
policymakers should recognize the tradeoffs created by these rules, and consider 
whether some adjustments may be warranted. 
4. Stewardship Codes. In a number of countries, such as the United Kingdom 
(Financial Reporting Council 2012), Japan (Council of Experts Concerning 
the Japanese Version of the Stewardship Code 2014), and Canada (Office of the 
Superintendent of Financial Institutions Canada 2013), concerns about whether 
institutional investors undertake adequate stewardship have led to the develop-
ment of nonbinding stewardships codes which various institutional investors have 
pledged to follow. Our analysis suggests that there is a problem with the incentives 
of institutional investors to spend on stewardship. To the extent that this is the case, 
stewardship codes putting forward aspirations, principles, or guidelines are likely 
to have less of an impact than if investment managers had appropriate incentives.
5.  Index Investing. The rise of index investing has generally been viewed as a 
positive development because it has reduced the cost of investment intermediation. 
Our analysis shows that a continuation of this trend could have significant costs for 
corporate governance. This analysis also highlights the challenges likely to result if 
index funds continue to grow as expected. 
6. Anticompetitive Effects of Index Investing. Recent work has raised concerns that, 
because index funds are invested across various corporations in an economic sector, 
they would have incentives to encourage those corporations to engage in anti-
competitive behavior that would enable them to capture monopolistic rents, (for 
example, Elhauge 2016; Posner, Scott Morton, and Weyl 2016).4 This line of work is 
based on the premise that index fund managers have strong incentives to take what-
ever actions would maximize the collective wealth of their beneficial investors. Our 
analysis indicates that index fund managers might well have different incentives, 
4 These arguments build on empirical studies by Azar, Schmalz, and Tecu (2017) and Azar, Raina, and 
Schmalz (2016), although these studies have recently been questioned by Rock and Rubinfeld (2017).
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which would lead them to limit intervention with their portfolio companies. Thus, 
our analysis suggests that it is implausible to expect that index fund managers would 
seek to facilitate significant anticompetitive behavior. 
7. Proxy Advisors. Institutional investors commonly employ the services of one 
or more proxy advisors, such as ISS and Glass Lewis, which analyze voting choices 
faced by investors in public corporations and make recommendations (Malenko 
and Shen 2016). Critics of proxy advisors would prefer that institutional investors 
reduce their reliance on the analysis and recommendations provided by proxy 
advisors (Clark and Van Buren 2013). Indeed, legislation currently being consid-
ered by Congress (previously titled the Proxy Advisory Firm Reform Act of 2016) 
would regulate proxy advisors in ways that might significantly increase their costs of 
operation and otherwise discourage their activities. Our analysis raises a concern 
that a reduction in the activities of proxy advisors would not be offset by increased 
spending on analysis by institutional investors sufficient to maintain even their 
current levels of monitoring. 
8. Hedge Fund Activism. There is a heated debate over the role of hedge fund 
activism. Whereas some writers, including one of us, have been supportive of such 
activism (for example, Bebchuk and Jackson 2012; Bebchuk 2013; Bebchuk, Brav, 
and Jiang 2015; Gilson and Gordon 2013), others view it as counterproductive 
and advocate various measures that would limit and discourage such activism (for 
example, Strine 2014; Coffee and Palia 2015). Some prominent critics of hedge 
fund activism would like to see the engagement currently conducted by activist 
hedge fund managers replaced by the stewardship of institutional investors. Our 
analysis shows the important role that activist hedge fund managers play in the 
corporate governance landscape. Because the incentives of mutual fund managers 
differ substantially from those of activist hedge fund managers, were the abilities 
of hedge funds to undertake such engagement to be impeded, stewardship by 
mutual fund managers would be unlikely to replace activist hedge fund managers 
in constraining agency problems in public corporations.
9. Wolf Packs. When an activist hedge fund takes a position in an underper-
forming public corporation, other hedge funds often acquire positions in the 
corporation (Brav, Dasgupta, and Mathews 2016). Groups of such “follower” hedge 
funds are commonly referred to as “wolf packs,” and various writers have suggested 
that they are a negative influence (for example, Coffee and Palia 2015). Our analysis, 
however, indicates that so-called wolf packs might serve a useful purpose. Because 
mutual funds might be reluctant to vote against incumbents, an activist hedge fund 
might sometimes be unable to win a proxy fight against underperforming incum-
bents when such victory would be in the interests of investors. By contrast, when a 
dispute between incumbents and an activist hedge fund draws other hedge funds 
to invest, the new shareholders are more willing to also invest in assessing which 
course of action would be optimal and to vote accordingly, including voting against 
the incumbents if they conclude it to be value-enhancing. 
10.  Shareholder Rights. For some critics of shareholder rights (Bainbridge 
2006, for example), the imperfections of institutional investors, and the fact that 
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stewardship decisions are taken by agents rather than the ultimate beneficial inves-
tors, provide a rationale for weakening shareholder rights and insulating corporate 
managers from shareholder action. Given that the agents may not be acting in the 
interests of beneficial investors, so the argument goes, there is reason to limit the 
power of the tools given to those agents lest they use the tools in ways that are coun-
terproductive to the interests of their beneficial investors. However, our analysis of 
the agency problems of institutional investors identifies a clear direction in which 
their stewardship decisions deviate from those that are optimal for their beneficial 
investors: investment managers can be expected to underutilize the tools they have 
to engage with corporate managers. 
Thus, notwithstanding the imperfections of investment managers as agents for 
their beneficial investors, there is little basis for concerns that institutional investors 
will interfere excessively with the actions of corporate managers. Accordingly, there 
is no reason to weaken shareholder rights or impede shareholder action based on 
such concerns. An understanding of the agency problems of institutional investors 
leads to the conclusion that modern corporations do not suffer from too much 
shareholder intervention, but rather from too little. 
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